Abstract. Let X1, X2, . . . , X k be independent n bit random variables. If they have arbitrary distributions, we show how to compute distributions X2, . . . , X k are uniformly distributed we demonstrate a large class of functions F (X1, X2, . . . , X k ), for which we can compute their distributions efficiently.
Introduction
Linear cryptanalysis is one of the most powerful techniques for cryptanalysis. It can be regarded as a generic attack. It is for example the fastest known attack on DES. More recently, we have seen that linear cryptanalysis also plays a major role in the area of stream ciphers. Many recent proposals have been analyzed through the idea of replacing nonlinear operations by linear ones, and then hoping that obtained linear equations are correct with a probability slightly larger than otherwise expected. Actually, the best known attacks on many recent stream cipher proposals are linear attacks. This includes stream ciphers like Scream [1] , SNOW [2, 3] , SOBER [4, 5] , RC4 [6] , A5/1 [7] , and many more.
Most work in linear cryptanalysis on block ciphers are based on bitwise linear approximations. To oversimplify, we find a sum of certain plaintext bits, ciphertext bits and key bits such that this sum is zero with a probability 1/2 + , where is usually small. By getting access to a large number of different plaintext/ciphertext pairs we can eventually find out the value of the sum of key bits. This results in a key recovery attack.
In linear attacks on stream ciphers, it is mostly the case that a linear approximation will give us a set of keystream symbols that sum to zero with probability 1/2 + . Since no key bits are involved in the expression, this gives us a distinguishing attack. In some linear attacks on stream ciphers, one has moved from the binary alphabet to instead consider a sum of variables defined over a larger set. For example, we can consider a sum of different bytes from keystream sequence if it is byte oriented. Distinguishers based on symbols from a larger alphabet have been considered in for example [8] [9] [10] .
It is clear that moving to a larger alphabet gives improved results. However, the computational complexity of finding the result increases. To be a bit more specific, assume for example that the operation X 1 X 2 is replaced by X 1 ⊕ X 2 , where denotes mod 2 n addition. The usefulness of such an approximation is given by the distribution Pr{(X 1 X 2 ) ⊕ (X 1 ⊕ X 2 ) = γ}. However, the complexity of computing this distribution can be large. For example, for n = 32 bits a straight forward approach would require complexity 2 64 , an impossible size to implement.
Several previous papers studied related problems. For example, in [11] differential properties of addition, such as DC + (α, β → γ) := Pr{(x y) ⊕ ((x ⊕ α) (y ⊕ β)) = γ}, were studied in details, including different useful and efficient computational algorithms. There are a few other results where different classes of similar functions (mostly related to differential properties) were achieved, e.g., in [12] [13] [14] , and others. However, these papers focus only on a small class of functions, which can be regarded as a subclass of the functions studied in this paper, refered to as pseudo-linear functions. Moreover, our main concern is the algorithms on large distribution tables, i.e., to provide a practical tool for cryptanalysis over large distributions (or a large alphabet). When, for example, the probability space is |Ω| = 2 32 , our algorithms and data structures allow us to store and perform the most common operations over such huge distributions, with a reasonable time on a usual PC.
Consider X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k to be independent n bit random variables. If they have arbitrary distributions, we show how to compute distributions like
For example, we compute the distribution Pr{(X 1 X 2 )⊕ (X 1 ⊕ X 2 ) = γ} in complexity 2 37 ·c for some small c. The presented algorithms makes use of techniques from Fast Fourier Transform and Fast Hadamard Transform. Although some of these techniques were also mentioned in a recent paper [15] , we include the full approach for completeness. We show how they can be performed when more complicated data structures are used, introduced due to a high memory complexity.
Next, if X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k are uniformly distributed we demonstrate a large class of functions F (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ), for which we can compute the distribution Pr{F (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ) = γ} efficiently. Here, the algorithms are based on performing a combinatorial count in a bitwise fashion, taking the "carry depth" into account. These results give us efficient methods of calculating distributions of certain functions F (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ). Fortunately, this includes many functions that appear in linear analysis of ciphers.
As an example, we show an application in linear cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. A typical operation is the approximation obtained when additions modulo 2 n are replaced by bitwise addition. The efficiency of such an approach is given by the bias of a distribution of the above kind. In our example, we give a new improved distinguishing attack on the stream cipher SNOW 2.0. In Section 2 we define a pseudo-linear class of functions and derive an algorithm to calculate their distributions. In Section 3 we show how a convolution of several distributions can be calculated efficiently. In Section 4 an application example of our approach to attack SNOW 2.0 is given. Finally, we summarize our results and make conclusions.
A Pseudo-Linear Function Modulo n and Its Distribution
For notation purposes we denote n-bit variables by a capital letter X, and 1-bit variables by a small letter x. Individual bits of X in a vector form are represented as X = x n−1 . . .
another integer number (concatenation). We use ' ' and ' ' to denote arithmetical addition and subtraction modulo 2 n , respectively. However, when the inputs to a function F (·) are from the ring Z 2 n , we assume '+' to be an addition in the ring as well. Matrix multiplication is denoted as '×'. When '·' is applied to two vectors, then it denotes element-by-element multiplication of corresponding positions from the vectors.
A Pseudo-Linear Function Modulo 2
n Let X be a set of k uniformly distributed n-bit (nonnegative) integer random variables X = {X 1 , . . . , X k }, X i ∈ Z 2 n . Let C be a set of n-bit constants C = {C 1 , . . . , C l }. Let T i be some symbol or expression on X and C. We define arithmetic, Boolean, and simple terms as follows.
Definition 1.
Given X and C we say that: (1) Note, if a given function contains a subtraction , then it can easily be substituted by using
which is valid in the ring modulo 2 n . Note that the number of A-terms does not grow during the substitution
As an example, let us consider a linear approximation of a modulo sum of the following kind 'X 1 X 2 X 3 → X 1 ⊕X 2 ⊕X 3 ⊕N ', where N is the noise variable introduced due to the approximation. The expression for the noise variable is a PLFM:
Finding the distribution of such an approximation could be the bottleneck in cryptanalysis work. The trivial algorithm for solving this problem would be as follows.
After termination of the algorithm we have Pr{N = γ} = T [γ]/2 3n . The complexity of this classical solution when the variables are 32-bits integers, is O(2 96 ), infeasible for a common PC. Instead, we suggest another principle to solve this problem, as follows.
T [γ] = some combinatorial function. In the upcoming section we show how this combinatorial function is constructed.
Algorithm for Calculating the Distribution for a PLFM
The problem we are considering in this subsection is the following. Given a PLFM F (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ) on X and C, we want to calculate the probability Pr{F (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k ) = γ}, for a fixed value γ, in an efficient way.
Let some arithmetic term A have k + operators '+', i.e., A = T 0 +T 1 +. . .+T k , where T j are some other terms, possibly B or S. Then, considering 1-bit inputs, the evaluation of the A term can, potentially, produce the local maximum carry
. This carry value at some bit t can influence on the next bits of the sum at positions t + 1, t + 2, etc. Therefore, the maximum carry value σ max at every bit t of the sum for A is then derived as the minimum integer solution for the equation σ max = (k + + 1 + σ max )/2 . Thus, for every arithmetic term A i the maximum local carry value is
where k + i is the number of additions in A i . For any t-bit truncated input tuple (X 1 , . . . , X k ) to the function F (·) we can define a tuple of local carry values for each of the A i -terms, as follows:
where σ i is the corresponding local carry value for the A i -term, when the inputs are t-bit truncated, and it can also be expressed as
. Assume there is an oracle P t (Ψ 0 , γ) which can tell us the number of choices of the tuple (
t·k possible combinations, such that for each choice the function F produces a required vector of local carry values Ψ | t = Ψ 0 , and the condition
. The probability we are seeking can now be written as
It remains to show how to construct the oracles P t (Ψ 0 , γ). Assume we know the answer 
, also referred for simplicity as P t , for all the consecutive valid tuples Ψ . The transformation from P t to P t+1 is a linear function, i.e., it can be written as
where M γt|t is some fixed connection matrix of size (θ max × θ max ), which, in general, is different for different t's. It depends on the t th bits of the constants involved in F (·), and it also depends on the value of the t th bit γ t from the given γ, since the oracle P t+1 (Ψ, γ) must satisfy γ taken modulo 2 t+1 as well. If the input variables are 0-truncated, then the only one vector Ψ | 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) of local carry values is possible, i.e., P 0 = (1 0 . . . 0). Therefore, we assign the oracle P 0 to be just a zero vector, but P 0 (0, γ) = 1.
In this way, 2n such matrices have to be constructed. However, in most cases this number is much less. The algorithm to construct matrices from (7) and then calculate (5) is given as follows. F (X 1 , . . . , X k ), and a fixed γ ∈ Z 2 n , we have:
Theorem 1. For a given PLFM
where M γt|t are connection matrices of size (θ max × θ max ), precomputed with the algorithm below.
Algorithm: Construction of 2n matrices M γt|t . 
Input:
F (X 1 , . . . , X k ) -a PLFMθ max = a i=1 (k + i + 1); M {0,1}|t=[0...n−1] [θ max ][θ max ] -2n square matrices of size (θ max ×θ max ), initialised
with zeros; 3. Precomputation algorithm:
for t = 0 . . . n − 1 Temporary set the constants from C to be just t th bit of the original ones, i.e., set (
k -(all combinations for the t th bits of X's)
all sub terms A j with the values (µ j mod 2), correspondingly
Evaluate the function f = F (·) mod 2, but substitute all terms A j with the values µ j , correspondingly
z Variables µi, which correspond to the terms Ai, should be calculated recursively.
The deepest A term should be calculated first, and so on.
Below we give an example that demonstrates all the steps of the algorithm.
Example 1. Let k = 3, n = 5. Assume that our goal is to calculate the probability Pr{F (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) = 10110 2 }, where:
The first step is to cancel the operator by (1), and by rewriting the expression we get
The function F (·) is a PLFM, since it can be expressed in A and B terms, marked above (the S terms are simply elements from the set {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , 26}). I.e., No need to construct the matrices for t = 2, 3, 4, because they will repeat as M * |t=2 = M * |t=0 and M * |t=4 = M * |t=3 = M * |t=1 . This happens since there are only two different combinations for any t th "bit slice" of constants from the set C = {26}. In particular, for every bit t we have 26[t : t] = 0 or 1 in step 3 in the figure above. Finally, from (8) we calculate
One can check this probability by the classical solution, trying all possible values for (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ) ∈ Z Preparing the matrices requires 2 · 2 3 · 6 = 96 steps (2 values for t, 8 combinations for (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), and the number of different local carries is θ max = 6); each step requires one function evaluation. To calculate one probability we need to make 5 multiplications of a matrix and a vector, which takes 5 · 6 2 operations, plus one scalar product of two vectors at the end, i.e., in total 186 operations. Calculating the complete distribution for all possible γ's takes 2 5 · 186 = 5952 operations in total. Note that the classical way requires 2 3·5 = 32768 steps with the function evaluation each step.
The second example presented in Appendix A is taken from the real cryptanalysis. In that example we, additionally, demonstrate a new trick and show how time complexity can be reduced even more than in Theorem 1. With a precomputation, which usually takes a negligible time, the construction of the complete distribution can have a very small time complexity O(θ max · 2 n ). That example also shows the advantage of using proposed technique as the computation complexity 2
96 from the classical solution is reduced down to 2 32.585 .
Distributions of Functions With Arbitrarily Distributed Inputs
The previous section assumed X 1 , X 2 , . . . to be uniformly distributed, allowing a combinatorial approach. In this section we consider X 1 , X 2 , . . . independent but with arbitrary distributions. Despite the ideas described in this section were partly mentioned in [15] , we include them for completeness. Let us have a probability space Ω of size q = |Ω| = 2 n and two distributions D X and D Y over Ω for two random variables X and Y , respectively. Given the distributions D X and D Y we consider two major types of convolution, defined as
where * is either or ⊕. In both cases the time complexity to calculate the resulting distribution D Z is O(q 2 ), i.e., quadratic. Due to such a high complexity, many attacks in cryptanalysis deal with at most 16-18-bit distributions only. Nowadays, when design of ciphers is often 32-bit oriented, it would be a challenging and useful task to perform a convolution of two 32-bit distributions, i.e., calculating Pr{X +Y = γ} for all γ when X and Y have some arbitrary distributions.
For notation purposes the distribution D X will also be represented as a vector of size 2 n of probabilities as [ [17] , the complexity of which is O(q log q) 2 . The convolution over can now easily be calculated as
Convolution over ⊕. A similar idea can be applied to this type of convolution. Instead, we use Fast Hadamard Transform (FHT) [17] .
FHT is a linear transformation of a vector of size 2 n . This transformation can also be done by a matrix multiplication H n × [V ] , where H n is a wellknown Hadamard matrix. FHT, however, performs this matrix multiplication for time O(q log q = n · 2 n ), the same as FFT. In practice, however, FHT is much faster than FFT, since it does not need to work with complex and float numbers. Therefore, approximations of kind ⇒ ⊕ are more preferable, than otherwise. Additionally, the implementation of FHT is extremely simple and small in C/C++, and we present it in Appendix C.
Since FHT
−1
n differs from FHT n by only the coefficient 2 −n , then the convolution over ⊕ via FHT is computed as
Finally, we point out that the convolution of a linear composition of k independent terms is derived as
where C i are some constants. In practice, this also means that if these distribution tables for X 1 , . . . , X k are stored with precisions ξ 1 , . . . , ξ k bits after point, respectively, then for probabilities of Z the precision of only ξ = n + k j=1 ξ j bits after point should be considered (or reserved) before the FHT procedure.
In sections above several algorithms have been derived with good time complexities, which, in most cases, allow us to operate on large distributions. However, memory complexity problems become to be the main concern for implementation aspects. We have algorithms that operate with 32-bit distributions, but how to manage the memory? We present a possible solution in Appendix B, suggest our data structures for large distributions and show how typical operations can be mounted.
Application: 32-bit Cryptanalysis of SNOW 2.0
A stream cipher is a cryptographic primitive used to ensure privacy on a communication channel. The SNOW family is a typical example of word-oriented KSGs based on a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). SNOW 2.0 is an improved version of SNOW 1.0 aimed to be more secure and still more efficient in performance. The most powerful attack on SNOW 2.0 was presented by Watanabe, Biryukov and De Cannie're [18] in 2003. It is a linear distinguishing attack similar to the general framework presented in [19, 20] and it requires a received keystream sequence of length 2 225 bits and has a similar time complexity. In this section we propose an improved attack on SNOW 2.0. Whereas the attack in [18] uses a binary linear approximation approach, the new attack is based on approximations of words, i.e., 32-bit vectors. This technique is more powerful and we get a reduction of the required keystream length to 2 202 . To make the calculation of 32-bit distributions possible we use our algorithms and data structures from Appendix B.
A Short Description of SNOW 2.0
The structure of SNOW 2.0 is shown in Figure 1 . It has 128-or 256-bit secret key and a 128-bit initial vector. It is based on LFSR over F 2 32 [x] and the feedback polynomial is given by
where α is a root of the polynomial
and β is a root of s0  s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6  s7  s8  s9  s10  s11  s12  s13  s14 The state of the LFSR is denoted by (s t+15 , s t+14 , . . . , s t ) . Each s t+i is an element of the field F 2 32 . The Finite State Machine (FSM) has two 32-bit registers, R1 and R2. The output of the FSM F i is given by
and the keystream z t is given by
Two registers R1 and R2 are updated as follows,
where S (W ) is a one-to-one mapping transformation S :
where S R is the Rijndael 8-to-8-bit S-box, and the linear transformation (matrix multiplication) is done in the field F 2 8 with generating polynomial
Basic Idea Behind the New Attack
The basic idea behind the new attack is to find such a linear combination of the output words z i that is equal to 0 if the system is linear, or producing some biased noise if the system is approximated by a linear function. From the other hand, the linear combination representing the noise should be unbiased if the given sequence z i is truly random. Consider the feedback polynomial of the LFSR given in equation (13) 
Next we make an approximation of the FSM to make it look linear. For any time t ≥ 1 two output words z t and z t+1 can be expressed as
Let us substitute → ⊕ and change S (R) → R. Then the sum z t ⊕ z t+1 is expressed as
where N 0 (t) is a variable representing the error introduced by the linear approximation in time t,
Here N c2 (R1, s t+15 ) is a noise random variable introduced by the approximation of the modulo sum of two variables of the following kind "R1 s t+15 → R1 ⊕ s t+15 ⊕ N c2 ". The variable N c3 (R2, s t+5 , s t+16 ) is a similar approximation noise, but for the modulo sum of three variables. Finally, N S (S (R1), R1)) is the noise variable from the approximation "S (R1) → R1 ⊕ N S ". Let us derive a linear relation, based on (21).
where N(t) is the 32-bit total sum of noise variables introduced by several approximations, expressed as
, and Z(t) is the "known" part calculated from the output sequence at any time t,
After all, a linear distinguishing attack can now be performed, if we know the distribution D N of the 32-bit noise variable N. For a sufficiently large number of received symbols from either the random distribution D Random , or the distribution of the noise D N , one can construct the type (or empirical distribution) D Type . We then make a decision whether the stream comes from a truly random generator or from the cipher, according to the distances from D Type to D N and D Random . Note, the 32-bit noise distribution definitely contains the best binary approximation found in [18] , but, clearly, it also contains some additional information, which makes the bias of the noise larger.
We will explain this procedure more in detail in the full version of the paper, but since this is a standard hypothesis testing we simply refer to e.g., [9, 21] .
Computational Aspects
To calculate the bias of the 32-bit noise variable N, its distribution table has to be constructed. It can be calculates via the distribution of N 0 , expressed in (24) 3 . To construct the distributions of N c2 and N c3 we use Theorem 1 (PLFM construction). The expression for N S is a function on one variable, i.e., it takes no more than O(2 32 ) operations to build the distribution D NS . Next, the distribution of N 0 is calculated via FHT with the algorithm from Section 3 (convolution over ⊕) and Appendix B (FHT for large distributions). Afterwards, the distribution of α · N 0 and α −1 · N 0 was computed using algorithms described in Appendix B (function evaluation). Finally, we again use FHT to calculate the distribution of the total noise variable D N , and then calculate the bias
All these operations took us less than 2 weeks on a usual Pentium IV 3.4GHz, 2Gb of memory and 256Gb of HDD.
Simulation Results and Discussions
At the end of our simulations we received the distance For future research work on this topic it is left to note that the expression for the noise variable N(t) (25) contains two parts: N c3 (R2 t , s t+5 , s t+16 ) and N c3 (R2 t+11 , s t+16 , s t+27 ), which, in our simulations, were considered as independent. However, since they both use the same input s t+16 , they are not really independent and, theoretically, the result should be slightly improved if one consider them as dependent.
Results and Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed new algorithms for computation of distributions of certain functions where the input variables are from a large alphabet. In the case when the input variables were uniformly distributed, the distribution for 3 We adopted the data structures from Appendix B for our simulations as follows: we use 2 10 files, each containing 2 22 points of a sub distribution. Since the precision of the probabilities have to be at least 2 −(192·4+32) (four noises N0, each containing NS with precision 2 −32 , Nc2 with precision 2 −64 , and Nc3 with precision 2 −96 ; plus 32 bits must be reserved for FHT), each cell has to be of size at least 100 bytes. I.e., each sub distribution in the memory takes at least 400Mb. However, this estimate is conservative, and in our simulations we used almost 2Gb of operation memory. a class of functions called PLFM was shown to be efficiently calculated. The second case considered the same problem but for arbitrary distribution of input variables. Efficient methods of calculating the distribution of sums of variables both in Z 2 n and F 2 n were proposed, based on Fast Fourier Transform and Fast Hadamard Transform, respectively.
The cryptologic applications of the results were demonstrated by extending the linear cryptanalysis of the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 to work over a larger alphabet. We believe that there are many instances of stream ciphers as well as block ciphers, where cryptanalytic results can be improved by considering analysis over a larger alphabet. In all these cases, the algorithms derived in this paper will be essential for calculating the performance of such attacks.
We also believe that the technique considering "local carries" presented in algorithms for PLFMs can easily be transformed for finding one or even all solutions for equations like F (X 1 , . . . , X k ) = 0. Finding solutions for other kinds of equations, including F (X 1 , . . . , X k ) = γ and systems of equations, is obviously converted to finding one or all solutions for an equation of the first kind. Consequently, many properties of PLFM functions can be derived, similarly as it was done for smaller classes in, e.g., [11, 12, 14] . More details will be included in the extended version of this paper.
A few open problems can be mentioned. Clearly, we would like to find other classes of functions where we can compute the distribution efficiently. Also, we would like to find further instances of existing ciphers where linear attacks over larger alphabets are applicable.
